This seems to have been introduced by the "fix" of -JENKINS-37481- (commit 05ad7b42033)... I obviously don't know all the ramifications, but the description in -JENKINS-37481- isn't really clear about the webhook configuration after the upgrade. It sounds like the webhook did have a signature token and the plugin's configuration wasn't updated accordingly after the update from 1.20.0 to 1.21.0.
All of this to say that I don't quite understand why this bug has been fixed this way. The /github-webhook/ endpoint is inbound, so the Jenkins configuration should have priority over what's coming from a request (imho), as it acts similarly to a whitelist. Otherwise, anyone can ping a Jenkins instance visible from the internet and omit this header and the request will be processed successfully. Maybe a distinct option in the UI to disable the security checks would be more explicit instead of using no credentials?
Any idea when this can be fixed?
This seems to have been introduced by the "fix" of -
- (commit 05ad7b42033)... I obviously don't know all the ramifications, but the description in -JENKINS-37481- isn't really clear about the webhook configuration after the upgrade. It sounds like the webhook did have a signature token and the plugin's configuration wasn't updated accordingly after the update from 1.20.0 to 1.21.0.JENKINS-37481All of this to say that I don't quite understand why this bug has been fixed this way. The /github-webhook/ endpoint is inbound, so the Jenkins configuration should have priority over what's coming from a request (imho), as it acts similarly to a whitelist. Otherwise, anyone can ping a Jenkins instance visible from the internet and omit this header and the request will be processed successfully. Maybe a distinct option in the UI to disable the security checks would be more explicit instead of using no credentials?
Any idea when this can be fixed?